This week, the Scottish National party faces a key vote on whether to join the pro-nuclear Nato alliance but says Ian Davis, of the Nato Watch thinktank, it can still afford to wait and think more deeply about Scotland's military needs
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The SNP has opposed Nato emphatically for decades, rejecting its reliance on nuclear weapons. Photograph: Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images
The Scottish independence debate is off and running, and officially too after Alex Salmond and David Cameron signed a deal on Monday giving the Scottish parliament new powers to hold an independence referendum.
But is the debate on Nato membership at the upcoming Scottish National party conference later this week an unnecessary fly in the independence ointment or a necessary purging of demons within the nationalist cause?
The SNP has opposed Nato emphatically for decades, rejecting its reliance on nuclear weapons. But as it faces the historic chance to win independence, Salmond and his defence spokesman Angus Robertson believe it needs to present a more centre-ground stance to a sceptical or undecided Scottish electorate.
This stance, still radical by comparison with anything south of the border, is to ban nuclear weapons and stay in Nato, with conditions on Scottish involvement in the deployment of international force. This proposed policy change has divided the party, including SNP members of the Scottish parliament, but the leadership is confident of winning the vote by about 2:1.
The arguments seem to revolve around whether an independent Scotland should remain in the collective embrace of Nato, or refuse to join as the organisation requires its members to support the theory of nuclear deterrence. And there seems to be an assumption that the question of independence is inextricably linked to the question of Nato membership.
I would beg to differ on both counts and have laid out my position in a new report released this week. I believe that an independent Scotland would, by default of leaving the UK, have to apply for membership of Nato. And that decision could still be made after the heat of the independence vote has died down and after full consideration of the potential benefits or detriments of membership.
The report, in essence, suggests a positive way forward for the majority of electors who have, thus far, indicated their support for an independent, non-nuclear Scotland – inside Nato. It also holds out an olive branch to all those nationalists opposed to full Nato membership by suggesting that a final decision on applying to join Nato should be deferred to a separate referendum.
There must be a wide-ranging debate about Scotland's role in the world: after all, these islands face no short to medium term military threat. We need a very different approach to understanding security concerns and needs, primarily with non-military outcomes envisaged.
From the twin starting points of an independent Scotland and the additional positive momentum engendered by the removal of Trident from Scotland – which would become a recognised non-nuclear weapon state under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, much could be achieved – either inside or outside of Nato.
While recognising that there are strongly held opinions on this issue, the debate need not be as contentious as sometime presented. An independent Scotland could both make a positive contribution to a redefined collective security as a member of Nato and, by working with other like-minded countries, challenge Nato's nuclear policy.
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to developing a military-lighter Scottish national security strategy is the muddleheaded notion that independent armed forces are at the heart of what it means to be a sovereign country. They are not.
Now you could argue that standing your ground until more gather around you to form a majority has got the SNP this far, so why change now?
The answer is that the SNP and other supporters of Scottish independence don't have enough time to gather sufficient numbers to change Scottish opinions on Nato membership and by persisting with the 'Scotland out of Nato' line they damage their chances of a clear mandate for independence. Without such a mandate, forcing the rest of the UK (rUK) to remove Trident and all the potential for alternative security thinking remains a distant pipe dream.
Most of those opposed to full Nato membership tend to be content with the existing SNP policy of being part of Nato's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. This 'half in and half out of Nato' compromise position is certainly a respectable one and a number of other countries are already in the same boat, including Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden.
Whether it is a credible enough position not to upset the independence apple cart is another matter. Under PfP would the Scottish electorate comprehend what is being offered sufficiently and would Scotland's voice be audible inside Nato conference halls? Probably not, on both counts.
Practical politics says play your strong card first - Trident can only be turned out of Scotland if the country becomes independent and, ultimately, Nato policy can only be influenced from within. Just imagine the impact of a strong independence vote (or even strong polls in 2013) on the rUK and within Nato. The alarm bells are already ringing in Westminster and Brussels.
Scotland is located in one of the safest and least threatened parts of Europe. Nonetheless, it is a country with an important strategic legacy, an active role in current UK defence affairs and potentially significant future security roles both within and beyond these shores.